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"It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces towards 
East or West; but it is righteousness to believe in Allah and 
the Last Day, and the Angels, and the Book, and the 
Messengers; to spend of your substance, out of love for Him, 
for your kin, for orphans, for the needy, for the wayfarer, 
for those who ask, and for the ransom of slaves; to be stead-
fast in prayer, and practise regular charity; to fulfil the 
contracts which ye have made . . . " 
- al Quran (2 : 177) 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES 
In the unitary Islamic perspective, economic activity is 
seen as only a subset of a wider human effort to usher in a 
just society based on Divine ethical principles, which are 
immutable because "There is naught that can change His 
words" (6:116). These principles are required to weave the 
kaleidoscopic 'facts' of life into a recognizable pattern and 
provide a formula for orderly social change based on justice. 
The Divine Law of al 'Adl symbolizes a set of Islamic 
principles, which acts as the norm to evaluate the justice or 
otherwise of existing social institutions. Being the opposite 
of Zulm, the Divine Law rules out the acceptance of social 
injustices even as a pretext for economic and social progress. 
Within the framework of a relatively absolute freedom of the 
individual, which rests on Man's theomorphic character, the 
Islamic commitment to maximizing social welfare is total. 
Any resistance to social change coming from the vested 
interest has been unequivocally condemned in the Holy 
Qur'an: "And leave Me (Alone to deal with) Those in posses-
sion of The good things of life, who (yet) deny the Truth. . ." 
(73 : ! ! ) 1 
' a . Yusuf Ali. The Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary. Vol. III. Lahore: 
Sh Muhammad Ashraf. 1972. p. 1634. 
(Vii) 
That ethics must be brought into the 'picture' explicitly 
should be clear from the fact that Islam's is a philosophy of 
the 'right' — i.e. it evaluates 'what is' with reference to 'what 
ought to be' The real challenge that Muslim economists 
must face lies in taking this ethical principle as the point of 
departure for a systematic and scientific enquiry into the 
fundamental rules of economic behaviour in an Islamic 
economy. The present series on "Islamic Economic 
Philosophy" seeks to provide a forum for a non-apologetic 
and scientific debate, which, by focusing on the interface 
of ethics and economics, works out the 'rules of the game' 
that economic agents must ideally follow in the pursuit of 
Islamically defined social bliss. 
The objective of this debate should be to evolve 
gradually the outlines of an Islamic economic system, with 
reference to which the veracity of specific statements about 
such a system can be verified. That such search must obey 
certain constraints of Islamic legitimacy must be clearly 
recognized by the researchers in this area. However, to 
make any progress at all it is important to define a minimal 
set of such binding constraints; or else there will be not too 
many "degrees of f reedom" left for scientific enquiry. In 
this search after the truth, Muslim economists will have to 
separate the fundamental from the subsidiary principles and 
the objectives from the policies designed to achieve them. 
The contributors to this series will be expected to make such 
distinctions, even if these sometimes appear to be only hair-
splitting. This will be a lot better than a light-hearted 
cataloguing of what cannot be done. 
(viii) 
Editor 
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INTRODUCTION 
Chapter I 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most ticklish problems in Islamization 
schemes pertains to replacement of the institution of interest 
by a set of alternative viable policy instruments. While there 
is unanimity among Muslim scholars that there is no place 
for interest in the Islamic vision of socio-economic process,1 
opinions differ about the alternative set of institutions with 
which to replace it, about its viability, and about its 
compatibility with the ideals of an Islamic economic system. 
The purpose of the present Essay is to expand and 
elaborate the theme presented in Naqvi [3] — that the 
problem of interest in an Islamic economy is a problem in 
dynamic optimization. Such an analytical framework has the 
advantage that, by its very composition, it formally in-
corporates the ethical assumptions underlying intertemporal 
investment decisions, e.g. the concept of intergenerational 
equity, and allows a rigorous analysis of the meaning and 
consequences of Islam's unequivocal insistence on the 
primacy of ethics over economics.2 Furthermore, this 
' T o avoid controversy, interest rate is taken, throughout this Essay, as synonymous with 
riba. For a comprehensive discussion of the meaning and purpose of riba, based on original 
sources, see Ziaul Haq [ 1 ] . 
2See Naqvi [4] and Nazeer [5] for an elaboration of this point. 
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analytical framework discounts the oft-repeated suggestion 
about the inevitability of the institution of interest and, 
instead, it states the minimal set of functions that must be 
adequately performed within the framework of a dynamic, 
capital-scarce economy, including an Islamic economy.3 We 
are thus led to view the novelty of the problem posed by 
Islam not in terms of the rules of the game of a dynamic 
economy, but in terms of the policy instruments that must 
be devised to play the 'game' in a manner consistent with 
Islam's ethical perception. 
In this context, an essential feature of any set of viable 
policy alternatives to the institution of interest is that, in 
order to fulfil the Islamic ethical requirement of al 'Adl, 
steps are taken to ensure intergenerational equity, and that 
adequate provision is made, in all 'states of the economy', 
to safeguard the economic interest of the least-privileged 
class in the society. One characteristic of the members of 
this class is that they are risk-averters, i.e. if they are allowed 
to choose between alternative financial arrangements, they 
would unambiguously prefer the one that guarantees them a 
fixed rate of return on their investment (saving). It follows 
that, from both economic and ethical points of view, much 
dubiousness attaches to financial reforms that have the 
effect of consolidating the hold of big capitalists on the 
financial market while crowding out persons of small means, 
3In the context of long-run equilibrium positions - i.e. stationary states - capital scarcity 
is defined as a state of affairs in which an additional amount of resources permits an alternative 
stationary state, which allows a higher consumption of some commodities and no lower 
consumption of any other commodity, in all future periods. If this state of affairs does not exist, 
we get the state of capital saturation, which is perfectly consistent with a zero rate of interest. 
For a discussion of this, see Koopmans [2, pp. 122-123]. However, the Islamic injunction 
against interest does not necessarily require capital saturation. 
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i.e. those who cannot afford to take any risks whatsoever. 
Indeed, such 'reforms', far from taking us to the Islamic 
paradise, will land us in a capitalistic hell! This is a situation 
that even capitalistic countries do not look forward to for 
their economic salvation. It must be clearly understood that 
risk-taking is not an absolute good in itself. On the contrary, 
to the extent that such an 'activity' is undertaken in an 
Islamic economy, its 'value' must be minimized. 
Once the problem is seen in this way, two important 
conclusions immediately follow: (i) interest rate cannot be 
wished away by an administrative fiat, without making far-
reaching arrangements in the financial and real sectors for 
an effective performance of the set of functions required for 
dynamic equilibrium; and (ii) it is a non sequitur that, since 
interest rate is bad, any policy which replaces it must ipso 
facto be good. The optimality of the alternative set of 
policies replacing the institution of interest must be 
established independently in terms of its superior merits in 
achieving the stated objectives of economic policy in an 
Islamic economy. In this connection, we examine and reject 
the notion that the problem can be solved by legislating a 
substitution of interest by profits throughout the economy. 
We hold the view that such a substitution is neither a 
necessary, nor a sufficient condition for the establishment of 
an Islamic economic system. This is especially the case if 
such a financial reform is taken to mean a replacement of 
a regime of fixed and variable rates of return on investment 
with one that promises only variable rates of return. In other 
words, there is no guarantee that once such a reform has been 
carried out, any real-life economy will thereby be trans-
formed, as if by the flourish of a magic wand, into an Islamic 
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economy. Indeed, one can easily think of model economies 
where investible resources are generated by activities of 
variable-re turns type, e.g. those based on gambling, betting, 
etc., which are definitely not Islamic. The challenge facing 
Muslim economists and policy-makers is not that of forcing 
all classes of investors (savers) into the procrustean bed of 
an economy where only variable rates of return on invest-
ment are available, but rather that of devising financial 
instruments which, in the absence of interest, safeguard the 
interests of all classes of investors (savers), both risk-averters 
and risk-takers. 
The present Essay is spread over seven chapters. The 
second chapter presents the model of a dynamic economy. 
It features a dynamic constrained-optimization model, which 
is used to 'separate' the institution of interest from its 
'functions'. It will be shown that when a fully dynamic 
analysis is carried out, interest rate in dynamic equilibrium 
must be equal to a sum of three terms: (i) a positive rate of 
social time-preference (i.e. present income being systemati-
cally preferred to future income); (ii) the social cost of 
using capital for productive purposes; and (iii) the secular 
decline in the utility (or increase in the disutility) of saving 
owing to its growth over time. Chapter 3 presents some 
characteristics of a model Islamic economy along with a 
somewhat modified version, which is due to Ramsey, of the 
model outlined in Chapter 2. The modified version differs 
from the basic model by the absence in it of positive (private) 
rate of time-preference. It is shown in these chapters that the 
model presented in Chapter 2 is an adequate representation 
of an Islamic economy. It is also shown that uncertain 
situations can be handled by the model, which uses 
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Hamiltonian equations, by 'reducing' them to 'as if certain' 
situations. 
Consistent with the general approach of this Essay, 
Chapters 4 to 6 examine the economic non-viability of 
alternative 'solutions' to the problem. We have examined and 
rejected the possibilities of abolishing interest by an adminis-
trative order, or by legislating a mechanical shift from an 
interest-based economy to a profit-based economy. Chapter 5 
offers a fairly complete analysis of the problem posed by 
the existence of risk and uncertainty. It is shown that in 
any Islamic solution financial instruments guaranteeing a fixed 
rate of return must coexist with those promising variable 
rates of return. This proposition runs counter to the position 
taken by many Muslim economists — namely, that an Islamic 
economy will feature only variable rates of return. Chapter 6 
sh ows that a dynamic Islamic economy must make adequate 
arrangements to perform all the three functions noted above. 
An active role of the government is noted in this context. 
The final chapter draws together the threads of the main 
argument of the Essay. 
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A MODEL OF A DYNAMIC 
ISLAMIC ECONOMY 
Chapter 2 
INTEREST RATE AND ITS FUNCTIONS 
In this chapter and the next we present an outline of 
a dynamic Islamic economy and its main characteristics. 
These chapters specify the problem of abolishing — or, 
more accurately, replacing — the institution of interest as 
a problem in dynamic optimization: an appropriate utility 
functional, incorporating Islamic ethical norms, is maximized 
subject to the constraint of maintaining optimal economic 
growth over a specified time interval. The solution of this 
problem yields, among other things, the desired 'separation' 
of the institution of interest from its functions in dynamic 
equilibrium. This is done in the present chapter. The next 
chapter will bring out other interesting insights that the 
model provides into the characteristics of a dynamic Islamic 
economy. 
It is interesting to recall in this context that a necessary 
condition for dynamic equilibrium is that the rate of interest 
must equal the marginal productivity of capital [1] . This 
apparently simple rule requires making complicated inter-
temporal adjustments in the basic parameters of the 
economy. A clear recognition of these parameters is, there-
fore, the main step in effecting an analytical 'separation' 
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between the institution of interest and its essential functions. 
The analysis in this Essay is conducted primarily in terms of a 
'real' dynamic economy. This procedure avoids complicated 
mathematics, without losing much of the generality of results 
obtained. For a positive (real) interest rate is essentially a 
relative price which equals the marginal rate of transfor-
mation between the present price of capital and the future 
price of capital, which, being a ratio, is independent of the 
unit of account in which it is expressed. Furthermore, in 
determining the movement of key economic magnitudes — 
e.g. level of saving, extent of investment, degree of employ-
ment — it is the real rate of interest that counts.1 
The next analytical step is to introduce money into the 
system and analyse the consequences of it in terms of the 
essential functions that interest performs. A full analysis of 
the problem is a complicated matter. However, at the level 
of generality of the present Essay, a highly 'stylized' treat-
ment of the problem should be enough. The outcome of 
such an analysis, presented at the end of this chapter, is that 
for a distortion-free economy in dynamic equilibrium money 
does not matter. 
INTEREST RATE IN A DYNAMIC 'REAL' ECONOMY 
A positive rate of interest arises in a dynamic real 
economy because the society, at a given point of time, must 
make an explicit choice between the amount it wishes to 
consume now and that which it chooses to consume in the 
' F o r instance, to increase (personal) savings in an inflationary period, the money rate of 
interest must be kept higher than the rate of inflation to keep the real rate of interest positive. 
The reverse chain of events is warranted in a deflationary period. 
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future.2 Since investment is essentially postponed consump-
tion, such a choice entails a decision regarding the optimal 
intertemporal allocation of investment. The problem is made 
difficult by the fact that, depending on the initial conditions, 
(e.g. the initial level of capital stock, in the present context) 
dynamic equilibrium is consistent both with too little saving 
and with too much saving; and a variety of feasible time 
paths of consumption satisfy the requirements of the steady-
state growth. Hence the need for finding an optimal growth 
path — in a loose sense, the 'best' among the many 'good' 
ones. 
Complications arise because the society must simulta-
neously examine the discounted sum of the utility of 
consumption over the entire planning period and keep the 
economy growing at the planned rate by making adequate 
provision for capital formation over the same period. In 
mathematical parlance, the problem is to maximize a current-
value utility functional,3 subject to the constraints of 
technology and restrictions on initial conditions relating to 
the size of the pre-existing level of capital stock. 
To bring out the role of interest rate in the above-
mentioned dynamic constrained-maximization problem, 
2 The treatment in this section has drawn on Arrow [1] and Dorfman [3] . 
3 A functional is a mapping from a set of functions into a set of functions, just as a 
function is a mapping from a subset of real numbers into real numbers. As such, it is distinct 
from a function of a function, which, given a real number, yields a real number. Given a function 
(or curve), a functional yields another function (or curve). For this reason, we deal with 
functionals rather than with functions in dynamic analysis which is the subject-matter of the 
calculus of variations and Pontryagin's Maximum Principle. For an exposition of the latter, 
see Pontryagin et al. [6 ] . 
consider a simple 'real' economy with the following 
characteristics.4 The production function is given by 
Y = f[K,L], (1) 
where Y is output, K is capital, and L is labour. It is assumed 
that the production function is 'well-behaved' and that the 
labour force is growing exponentially at a rate 7, so that 
L(f) = Lq exp (yt). (2) 
When full employment is assumed, the discounted utility 
of per capita consumption, x, for labour force is given by 
T 
u[x]= f [exp (7 - a)t] <p[x]dt, (3) 
o 
where a is the social rate of time-preference, which is 
independent of time, and 0[x] is the utility of per capita 
consumption.5 (The finite time-horizon problem can be 
converted to an infinite time-horizon problem by taking the 
limit T->°°.) 
The aim of public policy should be to maximize u[x] 
relative to the 'state' variable, namely capital per capita. 
This is done by manipulating the 'control' variable — namely 
per capita consumption — subject to a dynamic constraint. 
The dynamic constraint is given by 
4 T h e model presented in the text makes the restrictive assumption of 'malleability', i.e. 
capital can be shifted costlessly from one line of production to another in order to secure an 
optimal capital/labour ratio. 
s T h e variable x is a function of time, as are the variables v and p, introduced later. To 
avoid cluttering of symbols, we drop the explicit representation of time-dependence of these 
variables, e.g. 0[x(O] is written as 0 [ x ] . 
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v = $ [v] — x — {a + p)v, (4) 
where the 'state' variable v is the capital per capita, \p [v] is 
the productivity functional of the capital per capita, p is 
the rate of capital depreciation, and v denotes dv/dt. 
Note the chain of causation. Starting at time t = 0 and 
the initial value of 'state' variable, vQ, an optimal initial value 
of x > xQ is chosen. This gives a positive v in Equation (4). 
In this way the time-path is traced both of the 'state' variable 
v and of the 'control' variable x. 
Equations (3) and (4) constitute a typical constrained-
optimization problem, which is solved with the use of 
Pontryagin's Maximum Principle, involving the Hamiltonian 
H [x, v; p] = u[x] +pv 
= exp | (7 - a)t J. 0 [%] +p 11// [v] — x 
- (0 + 7)"* (5) 
where p, the Lagrange multiplier, is a dynamic 'shadow' 
price in the sense of giving the marginal contribution of the 
'state' variable, v, to total utility, i.e. . (Note that 
8v 5v 
signifies functional differentiation with respect to v.) To 
maximize the objective functional, the Hamiltonian must 
satisfy the Hamilton equations: 
= 
ov 
AIL 5 p = V, 
8H 
8x 
= 0. 
. . (6) 
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Also, the Hamiltonian must be extremal with respect to 
the 'control' variable. For the Hamiltonian given by 
Equation (5), these conditions yield 
exp [(7 - a)t] • <t>' [x] =p, (7) 
p\t'[v] -(7+0)| = - p , (8) 
where — p is the time rate of capital depreciation and 0' 
and 1y denote the functional derivatives of the respective 
func t iona l relative to the corresponding functions. We 
rearrange Equation (8) and eliminate p by computing the 
time derivative o f p in Equation (7), to get 
(0 [x] 
x (9) 
This equation gives the rule for optimal capital accumulation. 
It may be noted that this rule is limited to selecting the 'best' 
from a set of feasible steady-state positions corresponding to 
pre-assigned initial conditions; it does not necessarily pre-
scribe the most preferred course of action, given any arbitrary 
initial position. 
Now, recall the basic result for a growing economy in a 
steady state: 
f (0 = r [ v ] ( io) 
In words, interest rate, i(t), at any given point in time, 
equals the marginal productivity of capital.6 This makes 
6This rule follows directly by differentiating the production function, assumed to be 
linear homogeneous, with respect to capital (K). 
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sense because, as pointed out by Arrow [1] , investment can 
be regarded as a short-term loan of an arbitrarily short 
duration. Substituting Equation (10) into Equation (9), we 
get 
i(t) = a + j 3 0 " [X] 
0' [*] * ( n ; 
To be in dynamic equilibrium, the rate of interest is the 
price that the society must pay to offset a positive rate of 
social time-preference, and capital depreciation,7 and to 
provide for the increasing marginal disutility of saving owing 
to its secular growth. It must be noted that Equation (11), 
reflecting as it does the future movements of the profitability 
of investment throughout the economy, underscores the 
highly important fact that resource allocation of today is 
determined by our perception of the future. As noted by 
Frisch [4] , the first and third terms in Equation (11) are 
Bohm-Bawerk's second and first grounds for the existence of 
a positive interest rate: a positive a reveals 'the systematic 
under-valuation of future consumption', while the third term 
gives 'the decrease in the marginal utility of consumption 
owing to its growth'. 
INTEREST RATE IN A DYNAMIC MONEY-ECONOMY 
Let us now introduce money into the system. This 
complicates the picture considerably because money, in effect, 
introduces a second good into a single-commodity economy, 
which we have been assuming so far. 
7 It is interesting to note in this connection that the Keynesian rule, which compares the 
marginal efficiency of investment now with the rate of interest now, is not correct because new 
investment is marginal to capital. [See 2, Ch. 3.] This is an important point which has been 
missed by those authors who mistakenly quote Keynes to justify, on economic grounds, Islam's 
prohibition of interest rate. 
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A simple, though entirely legitimate, way of translating 
Equation (11) into an optimal rule for a dynamic money-
economy is to assume that the shadow (relative) price of 
capital is also the market price of capital. This is a reasonable 
assumption because in a steady state there will be no 
'distortion' in the system — i.e. the marginal rate of 
substitution (in a closed economy) will equal the marginal 
rate of transformation. By Equation (7) the term p{t)lp(t) 
will indicate the rate of inflation, once we make the 
additional assumption that while p (t)/p(t) > 0, i.e. the rela-
tive price of capital is rising, all other relative prices are either 
constant or also rising. With this additional assumption, an 
increase in the relative price of capital will lead to an increase 
in the general price level. 
It may be noted that, with inflation rate defined as 
p{t)lp(t), we do not get any additional terms in the funda-
mental Equation (11). This may be checked by differ-
entiating Equation (7) with respect to time. The reason is 
that i(t) appears only through \p'[v] in Equation (8). (The 
implications of differentiating Equation (7) will be discussed 
in Chapter 4.) In other words, within the framework of the 
assumptions made in this section, the money rate of interest, 
i (t), in dynamic equilibrium will be equal to the real rate of 
interest, so that Equation (11) holds in a money-economy as 
well, i.e. 
i m W - m = ( l r ) 
A full analysis of the consequences of introducing 
(fiat) money into the model is, of course, a more complicated 
matter than is indicated by Equation (11 ). As has been 
19 
shown by Jovanovic [5] , inflation tends to reduce welfare by 
lowering optimal per capita consumption below the level 
indicated by the Golden Rule of Accumulation. The latter 
result flows from the 'fact ' that inflation increases the cost of 
holding money-balances. How does this result affect 
Equation (11)? It should be obvious that only the size of the 
third term of the equation is affected, though not necessarily 
its (negative) sign, the other terms being constants. Hence, 
there is a possibility that i (t) < i(t). However, for the 
moment we rule out this possibility by allowing "inside 
money" into the model, which, as Jovanovic shows, will drive 
out fiat money and ensure that Equation (11') strictly holds. 
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Chapter 3 
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF 
A DYNAMIC ISLAMIC ECONOMY 
The fulcrum on which must rest the lever that is to 
move an Islamic economy is the Divine Law of al 'Adl 
The Divine Law connotes a grand balance of forces, or 
(normative) equilibrium, at the level of the Absolute, in the 
Universe and on the plane of social existence. 'Rational' 
individual behaviour must conform to this Law to ensure 
social justice. This conformity of individual behaviour to the 
dictates of social welfare is brought about, in accordance 
with the principle of al 'Adl, by enjoining a balance between 
an individual's freedom and his social responsibility. This 
conformity manifests itself in an explicit recognition of the 
"rights" of the "deprived" and the "oppressed" in the wealth 
of the rich so that the needs of the least privileged in the 
society are adequately met in all 'states of the economy'. 
By making economic behaviour subservient to the overriding 
dictates of ethical norms, the Divine Law enjoins a 
restructuring of the basic institution of the society in such a 
manner that these "rights" of the oppressed and the deprived 
are met. Since the Divine Law is timeless, it must be satisfied 
at a given point in time as well as intertemporally. Any 
1 For a detailed discussion of the assertions made in this paragraph, see Naqvi [ 3; 4 ] . 
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model of an Islamic economy must reflect this basic property 
of the Divine Law. 
In the present chapter we examine some basic character-
istics of the model presented in Chapter 2 with reference to 
the existence of a positive time preference in the model. 
Also, the suitability of the model in situations of risk and 
uncertainty will be investigated. 
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODEL 
In a dynamic context, the ethical principle of al 'Adl 
will require that equity in consumption be maintained not 
only within a generation but also intergenerationally. The 
model outlined in Chapter 2 provides an appropriate frame-
work within which to incorporate the Islamic ethical 
principles. The utility functional u[x] can easily be 
interpreted as incorporating the requirements of the 'target' 
groups whose consumption requirements must be met at 
all times;2 for the dynamic-equilibrium position, defined by 
Equation (6), represents a state of the economy in which as 
additional resources become available with economic growth, 
the consumption of the least privileged in the society will 
be higher while the consumption of all other income groups 
will be no lower [see footnote 3, Ch. 1] . An explicit identifi-
cation of the target group in the utility functional will 
considerably complicate the mathematics. But there is 
no conceptual difficulty in carrying out such an exercise. 
The solution procedure outlined in Chapter 2 should 
also be noted in this context. It will be recalled that the 
2 See Jan Tinbergen [ 6 ] , where he advocates the use of ethical principles as an integral part 
of welfare economics to resolve the problem of interpersonal comparison of utilities without the 
need to measure them. 
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problem is solved by manipulating the 'control ' variable x 
(per capita consumption). It can easily be stipulated that x 
is manipulated in a manner prescribed by Islam. Such a 
stipulation will ensure that both the rate of growth of the 
economy and the optimal allocation of investment between 
generations will also be determined in the prescribed manner. 
Remember that the rate of investment, which signifies the 
movement through time of the 'state' variable (capital stock), 
depends on the size of the capital stock and on the allocation 
at any given time between per capita consumption and the 
capital requirements of a growing labour force and capital 
depreciation. 
(i) The Problem of Positive Preference 
It may also be noted in this connection that a positive 
a in the utility functional should pose no problem from an 
Islamic point of view because discounting future consump-
tion is essentially a satisfactory method of comparing utilities 
associated with different levels of per capita consumption, 
without having to measure them explicitly. To bring out this 
point, let us consider an alternative formulation of u[x], due 
to Ramsey [5] , which explicitly postulates, on ethical 
grounds, a zero rate of time-preference and is written as 
oo 
u[x] = £ - <p[x] dt (12) 
The functional u[x] is the difference between the 
"bliss" level of consumption (B) and the utility of the actual 
level of per capita consumption, <p [x] . To make this utility 
functional Islamically acceptable, it can, again, be stipulated 
that the bliss level of consumption makes an adequate 
provision for the consumption of the poor. As before, the 
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problem is defined as maximizing Equation (12), subject to 
the constraint given by Equation (4), with y = a = 0. 
v = \p[v] - x-0v. (13) 
The solution of the problem is obtained, as outlined in 
Chapter 2, by applying the Maximum Principle,3 
4>'[x] = p (14) 
f [ v ] - p \ = - p (15) 
Using Equation (14) to eliminate p from Equation (15), and 
keeping in view Equation (10), we get 
/ ( f ) = 0 1 1 1 * 1 ' 
0' [x] 
X (16) 
It may be noted that Equation (16)4 differs from 
Equation (11) only by the absence of a in the latter. This is 
because, according to Ramsey [5] , the government, represent-
ing the society, should not discount the future because, un-
like individuals, it is not naturally myopic. However, authors 
like Marglin feel that it is undemocratic for governments not 
to discount the future when individuals do so. After all, 
democratic governments must reflect the preferences of the 
individuals in the society. 
The difficulty with such a view is that in order to reflect 
the preferences of the individuals, the government must find 
3 Ramsey [5] solved this problem by using Euler's equations. 
4 A s pointed out in Chapter 2, Equation (16) also holds in money economy since 
i (f) = i(t), where i (t) is the money rate of interest. 
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a way of averaging them, which will require positing axioms 
based on an irreducible value judgement. This is because, 
according to Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, no such rational 
deduction is possible from democratic premises. One of the 
tasks of Muslim economic policy-makers will, therefore, be 
to devise axioms, based on the teachings of Islam, reflecting 
the ethic ally-conditioned preference-ordering of individuals 
in an Islamic society. This is important because, unlike a 
communistic regime in which individuals do not matter, an 
Islamic society does not neglect the role of individual 
initiative.5 It also seeks a non-dictatorship solution to the 
problem of maximizing social welfare. 
In our view, it is more plausible to assume, ethically and 
economically, that myopic discounting should find a place in 
an Islamic economy, as in other economies, because a zero 
time-preference amounts to imposing a too heavy consump-
tion sacrifice on the present generation for the sake of poster-
ity — in violation of the Islamic tenet of al 'Adl. It follows 
that, strictly on ethical grounds, a- should be positive in an 
Islamic economy. 
The next question is: Granted that a > 0, how high 
should it be in an Islamic society? While we cannot give an 
authoritative answer, there is some presumption that it will, 
in general, be low.6 For Islam denounces in no uncertain 
sHowever, this point should not be used as a justification for the capitalistic mentality 
which glorifies egoistic behaviour and for which also Islam has little room. Islam allows for only 
constrained freedom, where social responsibility dictates commitment, rather than egoism, as the 
ideal form of the individual's economic behaviour. See Naqvi [3 ] . 
6 I t may be noted that when the rate of interest is zero - i.e. the cost of transferring 
future income to present consumption is zero - a positive (negative) time-preference implies 
negative (positive) saving. A zero or neutral time-preference will, therefore, result in zero saving. 
Thus a policy of reducing a to zero will only reduce the level of dissaving in the economy owing 
to this factor, when it is positive and high. It may also be noted that, with a positive time-
preference, dissaving will occur at low rates of interest. 
terms the squandering away of wealth on vain and 
conspicuous consumption. However, to make such a 
presumption operational, the basic parameters of the under-
lying Islamic economic model will have to be spelt out 
clearly. Furthermore, this presumption requires that the 
Islamically legitimate levels of consumption be defined and 
systematically enforced through a conscious government 
policy. 
(ii) The Problem of Uncertainty and Risk 
It has been objected7 that the model outlined in 
Chapter 2 is unsuitable for an analysis of the problem in an 
Islamic context; for the Hamiltonian equations are based 
on the assumption of perfect certainty, while a model of 
an Islamic economy should feature uncertainty as a promi-
nent part of the economic universe. 
This argument is based on a misunderstanding of the 
analytical technique used in this Essay; for the Hamiltonian 
equations can be used to comprehend uncertain situations as 
well. Note that we can write the 'uncertain' element in i(t) 
as a 'certain' ic(t) plus a stochastic term e(£). The 'uncertain-
ty' in i(t) is, then, just the scatter given by 
5 = f a e2 jt) dt (17) 
'i t2 - t x 
Thus i(t) can be statistically expected to be ic{t)±a in the 
time interval (ti, t2 )• Provided that 5 is sufficiently small, 
we can deal with ic(t) instead of i(t). This procedure is 
adopted, for example, in quantum mechanics where uncer-
tainties have to be included in all calculations. 
7See Anas Zarqa [7 j 
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A theorem, due to Ehrenfest,8 shows that the expecta-
tion values of all quantum quantities follow the classical 
laws, 
4- < q, > = < — - - > 
dt ^ 5 p. 
' (18) 
Ji < n> = < AtL >, dt H1 5 qf 
where qi and p( are the canonically conjugate variables, t is 
time and H is the Hamiltonian. In economics, the canonical-
ly conjugate variables can be interpreted as "quant i ty" {q() 
and the "shadow price" {p^. As in quantum mechanics, in 
economics, too, there is no guarantee of certainty in 
individual cases but we are nevertheless very sure of the 
average outcome. In other words, we can talk of an uncer-
tain situation as a certain situation on the average, even 
th ough we cannot do so for individual cases. 
The upshot of the discussion is that uncertain situations 
can be dealt with if we convert their average values, through 
risk minimization, into 'as if certain' situations. It may be 
noted that the requirement of minimizing uncertainty (and 
risk) is the only position consistent with Islamic economic 
philosophy. If this were not so — that is, if uncertainty was 
a good in itself — then gambling, betting and speculative 
practices, in which the element of risk is very large, would 
not have been declared hararn (prohibited) by Islam. 
8 The effect of the fluctuation denoted by 5, called "quantum fluctuation" in quantum 
mechanics, would have to be taken into account. This point is considered in Chapter 5, where 
risk-taking is discussed in more detail. For a discussion of Ehrenfest's theorem, see [2] . 
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REPLACING THE INSTITUTION 
OF INTEREST 
Chapter 4 
ABOLISHING THE INSTITUTION OF INTEREST IN AN 
ISLAMIC ECONOMY 
The analysis presented in Chapter 2 was limited to 
separating analytically the institution of interest from the 
minimal set of the essential functions that it performs to 
keep the economy in dynamic equilibrium. The next 
question is: exactly what policy instruments will be required, 
in the absence of the institution of interest, to perform these 
functions in an Islamic economy? It is proposed in this 
chapter to discuss briefly the consequences of abolishing 
the institution of interest by an administrative order, without 
providing an alternative mechanism for pricing capital in an 
Islamic economy. 
ADMINISTRATIVE FIAT 
To replace the institution of interest, one possible 
policy option is to abolish it by an administrative order. Our 
analysis has made one thing absolutely clear: in a capital-
scarce economy, interest rate can never be abolished by an 
administrative fiat without making provision for alternative 
financial and real institutional arrangements to ensure that its 
essential functions, identified above, are performed effec-
tively. if such arrangements are not made, all capital will 
depreciate without replacement through unrestricted capital 
consumption. This observation can be easily proved. 
Theorem 1: The utility of per capita consumption increases 
exponentially over time if interest rate is set 
equal to zero. 
Proof: Putting interest rate equal to zero in Equation 
(11), we have 
t - O F L ] X = A + P ( 1 9 ) 
<p [x) 
Integrating both sides of the equation yields 
ln<p'[x] = lnA + {a + p)t, (20) 
where InA is a constant of integration. Clearly, 
A > 0, as InA is not defined for A < 0. Since 
the integration is over time, A cannot be a 
function of time. Further, since x is a function 
of time, A cannot be a function of x. Thus, 
on exponentiating, 
0' [x] = A exp [(a +0) f ] (21) 
Multiplying both sides by x, we obtain 
4>[x] = A exp [(a + 0)f] x. . . . ( 2 2 ) 
Now, clearly, x must be a non-decreasing 
function of time; for we cannot let per capita 
3 3 
consumption fall over time. Since a, 13 < 0, 
the time rate of change of is at least 
exponentially increasing. For this to be true 
(p[x] must, at least, be an exponentially 
increasing function of time. 
Q.E.D. 
The result is intuitively clear. Making interest rate zero 
by administrative fiat will result in a maximal marginal utility 
of consumption or — which is equivalent — a maximal 
marginal disutility of saving. Since saving must equal invest-
ment in dynamic equilibrium, it follows that in this case 
investment will be minimized. This cannot possibly be the 
objective of an Islamic economy, particularly as Islam does 
not encourage profligate squandering of wealth. 
Next consider the consequences of abolishing interest 
through an administrative fiat when the possibility is allowed 
for a change in price level.1 
Theorem 2: If interest is zero, the (market) price of capital, 
p{t), will increase exponentially. 
Proof: Using Equations (8) and (10), we can write 
^ = -[ M - (y + &)]. (23) 
Integrating Equation (23) over time yields 
' F o r a statement of the conditions under which a rise in the market (relative) price of 
capital leads to a rise in the general price level, see the last section of Ch. 2 of the present Essay. 
34 
Hp(t)] =-fi(t)dt + {7+($)t + lnp0, (24) 
where In po is a constant of integration. 
Exponentiating Equation (24) gives 
p(t)=pQ exp [(7 +0)f] exp [-fi{t)dt] 
(25) 
Now, if i{t) = 0 in Equation (25) we see that 
p{t)=poexp[{y+0)t] (26) 
Q.E.D. 
This result implies that if interest rate is arbitrarily set 
equal to zero, the price level will increase exponentially over 
time at a rate which is the sum of the rates of capital 
depreciation and labour growth. 
The analysis presented here clarifies the simple, though 
often neglected, point that the Islamic position is not so 
much the abolition of interest, as it is its replacement by an 
appropriate set of policies.2 This is because, in a capital-
scarce economy, the shadow price of capital can never be 
zero. However, it does not imply that an administrative 
order will not be involved in replacing the institution of 
interest. 
2 For a clear statement of this important 'clarification', see M.S. Khan [1] and Naqvi [2; 
Ch. 7 ) . 
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Chapter 5 
FIXED AND VARIABLE RATES OF RETURN IN AN 
ISLAMIC ECONOMY: THE PROBLEM OF RISK AND 
UNCERTAINTY 
The observations made in the preceding chapters show 
that the answer to the problem at hand is not to abolish 
interest by any means whatsoever. The set of policies replac-
ing interest must satisfy two basic conditions: (i) they must 
meet the requirements of a dynamic economy; and (ii) they 
must be consistent with the Islamic requirement of al'Adl. 
In this chapter we ask the question that lies at the centre of 
the debate about a model Islamic economy: can an economy-
wide replacement of interest by profit meet these two condi-
tions? Since there is no difference of opinion among Muslim 
economists about the question of replacing the institution uf 
interest, we rephrase the question to ask whether a model 
Islamic economy is an economy based on fixed and variable 
returns on investment or whether it is one which is based 
only on variable rates of return. Our answer to the question 
is that an economy based only on variable rates of return is 
not viable. It is also not ethically acceptable since it violates 
the dictates of the Divine Law. 
To understand the reasoning behind these assertions, let 
us consider two extreme examples of an institutional reform 
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according to which investments (savings) yield only variable 
rates of return but which does not satisfy the dictates of 
Islamic legitimacy. First consider a hypothetical economy in 
which corporate retained earnings (profits) are the only 
source of financing capital formation. In such an economy, 
the processes of saving and investment are brought together, 
so to speak, under one roof. A positive rate of interest is not 
required here to directly1 promote saving or to redirect it 
into alternative investment channels. The consumer in effect 
'grants' an interest-free loan, through the market, to the capi-
talist who then invests these funds directly into productive 
channels. Under this arrangement, saving originates in the 
corporate sector as a result of a combination of fiscal, price 
and wage policies — all tending to swell undistributed corpo-
rate profits, which are then reinvested.2 This is done on the 
premise that it is more efficient to divert investible resources 
into the hands of those who can use them effectively, though 
not necessarily optimally. Such an arrangement, which 
induces a highly unequal redistribution of income and 
wealth, is obviously un-Islamic in spirit because it runs 
counter to the principle of al 'Adl. 
Another extreme example of an economy that promises 
only variable rates of return on investment (savings) is one 
that relies completely on such activities as gambling, betting, 
etc., to generate all, or most, of its investible resources. This 
is obviously not a shining example of an Islamic reform. 
'However, the interest rate does enter indirectly into the process of generating savings. The 
constellation of policies required to create the economic scenario outlined in the text includes 
low interest rates. But for the purposes of the argument in the text, let us assume that this is not 
the case. 
2Umer Chapra [1) implicitly accepts as Islamically legitimate such a capitalistic order. 
See his review of Naqvi's book [3] in [2 ] , 
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Imagine Monaco and Las Vegas as models of an Islamic 
economy! At any rate, such activities are explicitly prohib-
ited in Islam. 
These two extreme examples serve to highlight the 
central proposition which we prove in this chapter — namely, 
the purpose of Islamic reform is not, as is often accepted 
uncritically by most Muslim economists, to replace, through-
out the economy, financial instruments ensuring both fixed 
and variable rates of return with those promising only vari-
able rates of return on investment.3 In a complex modern 
society there is a continuum4 of risk-takers, and its financial 
structure must take care of the preferences of all classes of 
risk-takers, including those who do not want to take risk — 
i.e. the risk-averters who 'strictly' prefer an investment which 
guarantees a fixed rate of return. 
The following discussion, which is quite general in its 
scope, presents an account of the complexity of the decision-
making process in an Islamic economy under conditions of 
uncertainty and risk. 
A Mathematical Formulation 
Let the variable rate of return on investment be ex-
pressed as P{t)5 and the fixed rate of return as i(t). P(t) can 
3 More specifically, it is suggested that Islamic financial reform should aim at substituting a 
financial system based on equity financing alone for the existing capitalistic system based on 
equity and debt. See, for instance, Umer Chapra [2 ] . The undesirable consequences of such a 
' reform' are brought out most clearly in Case III considered later in this chapter. 
? More accurately, of course, since the population is finite, and in any case denumerable, 
we do not have a continuum. However, we are anyhow regarding the population as sufficiently 
large to be approximated by a continuum so that calculus can be applied to its analysis. 
sP(t) is to be distinguished from P(t), which was used in previous chapters to denote the 
shadow price of capital. 
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be expressed as the sum of its expected value, < P(t) > , and a 
stochastic term e(t) so that 
P(t) = < P{t) > + e(t), . . . . . . (27) 
where < e(t) > = 0 by definition. 
Case I 
The first case to consider is one in which uncertainty 
tends to zero — i.e. e (*)-»• 0 in Equation (27). From the 
fundamental equation, Equation (11), such an assumption 
implies that P(t) would tend to i(t) — i.e. 
lim P{t) = i(t) = a + p - f-O^l) x 
e(f)-*0 ' 
(28 ) 
In words, investors, when confronted with a choice 
between investment alternatives, would prefer an arrange-
ment that guarantees fixed rates of return — call it P(t) or i(t). 
It may be noted that such a substitution of i{t) by P(t) 
satisfies Equation (11), but it does not meet the condition of 
Islamic legitimacy if this condition is interpreted to mean, 
incorrectly in our view, that e (t) 0 always. 
Case II 
Let us now consider the more general case in which 
e(f) 0, i.e. the variance of uncertainty, <e 2 (t) > , which is 
also a measure of the risk involved in investment, has a finite 
value. In this case, P(t) -b- i{t). Here the investor would no 
longer be indifferent, as in Case I, to the choice between i[t) 
and P(t). It is interesting to see that here we have a case in 
which the alleged Islamic assumption (that e(t) ¥= 0) is 
4 0 
satisfied, but the resulting financial arrangement — P(t) i(t) — 
does not satisfy Equation (11). 
Let us analyse this case in detail. It is shown below that 
the following fundamental theorem must hold for investors 
to prefer variable rates of return on their investment. 
Theorem 3: A variable-return investment will be strictly 
preferred to a fixed-return investment, i(t), if 
the rate of return has an expectation value 
< p ( 0 X M . [ y i ± l ^ ! M > + i ] , 
(29) 
where k is a measure of risk-aversion. 
Proof: When <e 2 (t)> is finite, let the rate of risk pre-
mium be r(t), so that 
<P[t)> = i(t) + r{t). . . . . . .(30) 
Now the risk premium must be proportional to 
the risk involved, which is measured by <e2 (£)>, 
which, in turn, must be inversely proportional to 
<P{t)>. Hence we have 
= K ( 3 1 ) 
Since e(t) is measured in the same units as r[t) 
and <P(t)>, K is independent of units and is, 
therefore, a pure number. The risk premium is 
higher for someone who likes to avoid risk than 
for someone who does not mind taking risk. 
4 1 
K is a measure of the degree of risk aversion, 
and its value is higher when the preference for 
risk aversion is greater. It will be noted that, 
apart from individual preferences, K depends 
also on the size of the capital (saving) available 
in the economy. Thus K < 1 if the capital stock 
is sufficiently large and K > 1 if the capital stock 
is relatively small. 
Inserting Equation (31) into Equation (30) 
yields the quadratic equation 
<P{t)>2-i(t) <P{t)> - K<e2 (t)> = 0, 
. . . (32) 
for the minimum value of the expected rate of 
variable returns. This equation has two solutions 
<P(t)> = [i(t)±Vi2(t)+4K<e2(t)>] 
. . 2 . . . (33) 
Since the lowest root is negative, which implies 
an economically unacceptable negative variable 
rate of return in the face of a positive fixed rate 
of return, the lower root does not give the least 
acceptable value for the latter. Hence, 
<p(t)> = M . [ / i + 4 ^ 2 (0 +11 
2 L V i2(t) 1 
. . . (34) 
Thus, for investment promising a variable return 
to be strictly preferred, the rate of return must 
be greater than that given by Equation (34). 
Q.E.D. 
4 2 
Clearly, <P(t)>, given by Equation (34), is not less than 
i{t). In fact, if there is any risk aversion (however small) and 
any risk involved (however small), <P(t)>, given by Equa-
tion (34), must be strictly greater than i{t). In other words, 
the investors (savers) must be able to anticipate, with com-
plete confidence, that a regime of a variable rate of return 
will always give them a higher reward on their investment 
than a regime of a fixed rate of return.6 This is a very im-
portant result. 
Let us discuss the implications of Equation (34) in 
different 'risky' situations. 
(a) High-Risk Case: Consider, first, the case in which 
risk is extremely high, i.e. <e 2 (£)>-»<». In this case, clearly, 
<P[t) > 00 as \f<e2 (t)> 00. In words, P(t) would have 
to become infinite for investment to be made at all. And since 
there are only two factors of production in our model, 
capital and labour, this case also requires that wage rate (w) 
should tend to zero, i.e. w(t)-+ 0. 
These considerations drive home the point that since in-
creasing of risk without bound would cause investment (and 
wages) to vanish, risk cannot be maximized. Hence risk-
taking cannot be regarded as good in itself. However, given 
the inevitability of positive risk in any dynamic economy, 
including an Islamic economy, it can only be minimized. 
6Compare this result with the observation made at the end of Chapter 3 that uncertain 
situations can be handled by converting them into 'as if certain' situations. Here it is shown that 
this 'conversion' must occur. 
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(b) Low Risk-Aversion Case: We next consider the very 
low risk-aversion case, K< < 1. This situation will be charac-
terized by 
<P{t)> > i(t) + K (35) 
(c) 'Normal' Risk-A version Case: This is the case when 
K = 1. In this case we have 
<P(t)> > /(f) + — ^ (36) 
(d) High Risk-Aversion Case: On the other hand, for 
very high risk-aversion, K > > 1 
<P(t)> > / < e 2 ( f ) > J V . (37) 
Comparing these four cases, (a) — (d), it may be noted that 
for high risk-taking we get a result similar to that for high 
risk-aversion: <P(t)> must be large and should increase 
without bound as the risk involved in making investment de-
cisions increases. On the other hand, for low risk-taking or 
low risk-aversion, <P(t)> must be greater than i[t). In any 
case, <P(t)> must be strictly greater than i[t), as pointed out 
above. 
Case III 
Another important case to be considered is the one in 
which i[t) = 0. Putting i(t) = 0 in Equation (33), we get 
<P[t)> > 7 < e 2 ( f )> / 7 7 (38) 
4 4 
Here K is generally greater than unity, because there is no 
positive i(t) to "cushion" any losses. Again, if K = 1, we 
have the requirement that 
<JP(t) > > V < e 2 (0>- (39) 
As such, only capitalists would have K approaching unity. 
(Only gamblers could, in this case, have K « 1.) Clearly 
this situation is highly unstable since only those who have a 
lot of money can afford to invest. As such, K would be im-
possibly large for the bulk of the population, and the general 
tendency would be for a population of the poor people to 
work to support a very small group of capitalists with k = 1. 
The risk-averters and the moderate risk-takers will be crowd-
ed out of the financial market. This is hardly an example of 
an Islamic solution. 
Case IV 
It follows that in any viable Islamic economy, 
j c < e ^ t j > must be kept sufficiently low to let Equation 
(35), rather than Equation (37), hold. Since K will be 
large for the bulk of the population, <e 2 (t)> must be kept 
much less than i2 (t); or 
7 < e 2 ( 0 > < i (t) . (40) 
Equation (40) may be read in reverse as giving a condi-
tion in which the fixed rate of return must be more than the 
square root of the variance. Only then would the small savers 
be encouraged to save. For K< 1 we should have investment 
available with higher risk, but we still require that 
•J<e2 ( f ) > < i{t). ( 4 1 ) 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We thus conclude that an economy which promises 
variable rates of return alone is only feasible if all classes of 
investors are guaranteed a higher return than would obtain 
otherwise. This is just another way of saying that such a 
regime is not feasible without such a guarantee. But an 
Islamic economy can provide such a guarantee only if 
the financial instruments that offer a fixed rate of return 
coexist with those giving variable rates of return. This 
conclusion is logically impeccable and economically reason-
able. It is also 'earth-shaking' because it turns the table 
against those Muslim economists who justify a regime which 
promises only variable returns on investment on the ground 
that, according to them, it is Islamically just and economical-
ly viable. Our discussion shows that this cannot be the case: 
such a regime, if it exists, will have no place for small inves-
tors (savers). Hence, such a regime is unacceptable from an 
ethical point of view. However, if efforts are made to make 
room for small investors, such a regime must cease to exist! 
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Chapter 6 
REPLACING THE INSTITUTION OF INTEREST 
IN AN ISLAMIC ECONOMY 
We know now what kind of reforms will not accomplish 
the goal of replacing interest in an Islamic economy. In 
particular, we can see clearly that the replacement of a 
regime of fixed and variable rates of returns by one which 
promises only variable rates of return is neither economically 
viable nor ethically justifiable. The central question that 
must now be answered is: if the many policy options ana-
lysed in the last two chapters do not provide viable answers, 
then what else does? Our answer is that we must look for 
policy alternatives which ensure that each of the three terms 
unveiled by Equation (11) — namely, a, |3 and ^ x — 
0' [x] 
remain positive. To establish this point, let us consider in 
this chapter the reasons why each of these terms must remain 
positive. Exactly what policies will ensure the positivity of 
these three terms is a matter of detail, which we discuss 
only briefly. Although it is not central to our argument, 
there is an a priori case for an increasing role of government 
in the achievement of this result. This is especially true of 
countries where capital markets are imperfect. 
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SOCIAL TIME-PREFERENCE (a) 
It was noted in Chapter 3 that a will continue to be 
positive in an Islamic economy. Theorem 5, discussed below, 
provides a rigorous demonstration of the inevitability of a 
positive a when we allow in our model, as we must, for 
positive growth of the labour force. Here, as in Chapter 3, 
we continue to discuss the proposition in general terms. 
At a moral level, habits of simpler living as enjoined by 
Islam would probably keep a low. But this is not the same 
thing as asserting that individuals will divert, without limit, 
future income to present consumption as a -> 0 under the 
force of moral persuasion, since this implies that individuals 
will systematically start preferring future income to present 
income just because of moral restraint. This is not an 
economically acceptable proposition. A positive time-pref-
erence derives its plausibility from the hard economic fact 
that while the present income can be deployed to take 
advantage of profitable investment opportunities as long as 
marginal productivity is positive and large, future income 
cannot be so used. However, note that even with a=0, while 
all dissaving ceases, net saving will still be zero! To generate 
positive saving it is essential that a should be negative. In a 
capitalistic system, a positive rate of interest generates posi-
tive saving by increasing the cost of diverting future income 
to present consumption — that is by making a negative.1 
How can this task of turning a positive a into a negative a 
'Alternatively, one can also think of a positive rate of interest as enhancing the future 
income of savers by making it possible to lend present income for future consumption. In the 
case noted in the text, a positive rate of interest plays the role of decreasing the amounts of 
future income, which can be transferred to present consumption by borrowing. 
4 8 
be accomplished in an Islamic society, in the absence of a 
positive rate of interest as a policy instrument? In other 
words, how can positive savings be generated in the face of a 
positive (though much lower)a? 
The key to an understanding of the problem lies in re-
membering that while private time-preference will continue 
to be positive, there is no need for the public time-preference 
to be positive as well. The government is not hampered by 
'optical illusion' with respect to future possibilities that indi-
viduals suffer from. Hence, generating 'net' public saving 
really amounts to more than offsetting the private a, which 
is positive, by a government a, which must be made negative. 
It, therefore, appears that the share of public saving will 
have to increase substantially in total saving. This is 
especially true of developing countries where capital markets 
are imperfect. But the basic point to grasp is that financial 
institutions, in both public and private sectors, have to be 
created to offset individual positive time-preference in order 
to generate positive saving. 
DEPRECIATION OF CAPITAL (0) 
We have already seen that an important role of a 
positive rate of interest is to provide for depreciation of capi-
tal. Hence, in the absence of the institution of interest, 
public policy must aim at making enough provision for this 
purpose. 
This is simple enough. What else must government 
policy do towards this end? The answer is that, within the 
context of the model outlined in Chapter 2, public policy 
must require that i(t) be not less than 0. This requirement is 
4 9 
important. We, therefore, state it formally. The basic point 
here is the positivity of z'(f), which is defined in Chapter 5 as 
any financial instrument which ensures a fixed rate of return 
on investment. 
Theorem 4 : The function of a positive z'(f) is to provide for 
capital depreciation, 0, and the increasing 
scarcity of capital due to the rate of increase of 
the labour force, irrespective of the values taken 
by a and 0(x). 
Proof: Notice that if we take a constant value of t(f), 
given by 
/(f) = 0 + 7, . . . . . . (42) 
the price of capital, p(t), given by Equation 
(23), remains constant over time. Note further 
that Equation (42) implies that in Equation (11) 
7 = a. — J l M U . . . . . . (43) 
0 [x] J 
so that p(t) does not depend on a and 0(x). A 
(positive) constant t(f) is required to offset 
capital depreciation and increase in labour 
force. If i(f) falls below this minimal value, 
the price of capital would start to rise sharply, 
making positive investment increasingly costly. 
Q.E.D. 
It should, therefore, be clear that z'(f) must be kept posi-
tive through active government policy, even if its sole 
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purpose is to provide for depreciation of capital and an in-
crease in the labour force.2 
MARGINAL UTILITY OF CONSUMPTION (DISUTILITY 
OF SAVING) OVER TIME 0 " \x] 
0' [x] 
X 
It should be clear that the third term in Equation (11), 
f ' J x l 
0' [x] 
x, must be positive in an Islamic economy. To see 
this, "we need to show that the third term has the same sign 
as x . 
The proof of the above statement is, however, 
non-trivial. We will need to prove, first, a theorem which will 
be used to prove the above-mentioned assertion. 
Theorem 5: Given a, P and y, the utility of per capita con-
sumption is a unique function of time for a 
given initial utility and rate of growth of per 
capita consumption. 
Proof: We start the proof by noticing that 
l i ^ ] } * { t ) =\ l U 0 [ X ( 0 1 ) ' • • • W 
Inserting Equation (42) into Equation (11) gives 
i(t) = a + p - j/n 0' [*(*)]) ' . . . (45) 
To ensure dynamic equilibrium, Equation (42) 
must be satisfied. 
2 
Note that, according to Theorem 5 discussed below, under such circumstances a must 
also be positive. 
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Using this value, 
| In 0'|x(f)]j x = (a — y). . . . (46) 
Integrating this equation over time yields 
In 0 [x(t)] = InA + ( a - 7 )t, . . . (47) 
Where InA is a constant of integration. Exponen-
tiating this equation yields 
0'[x(£)] = A exp [(a-y )t]. . . . (48) 
We need to integrate, functionally, this equation 
with respect to the function x(t). Since the 
right side of the equation contains time, we 
must regard time as a function of per capita con-
sumption. This is valid only if x(t) is a mono-
tonic function. Now x(t) must be non-decreas-
ing for any economy so that people's standard 
of living should not drop continuously. If x(t) 
were constant, <p'[x(t)] would have to be 
independent of time (with a = 7). This is a 
special case of a linear function. Otherwise, x(f) 
must be monotonically increasing. Thus 
0[*(O] = A exp [(a - y)t(x)] dx-
(49) 
To replace the functional integral with an ordi-
nary integral, we need to integrate with respect 
to time. Thus we must write 

<P[x(t)] = [exp ((a - 7 ) f | - 1] 
+ 0 [x(0)] • • • ( 5 4 ) 
Thus, if a > 7 , <f>[x(t)] is an exponentially increasing function 
of time. Clearly, if a < 7, 0 [x(f)j approaches a constant 
*[*(«)] = 0[x(O)] . . . (55) 
(7 - a) 
If x(t) increases exponentially at a rate 5, then 
0 [*(£)] = [exp | ( a - 7 + S ) f ) - 1 ] ^ ^ 
+ *[*{ 0)] , . . . . . . (56) 
provided 5 7 — a. The behaviour is similar to that given by 
Equations (54) and (55) according as 5 ^ 7 - a. In case 
5 = 7 - a, 
0 |>(f ) ] = ^45t+ 0[x(O)]. . . . (57) 
We see that, generally, if per capita consumption 
increases (decreases) over time, so does its utility, provided 
that the rate of increase is greater (decrease is less) than the 
difference between the rate of growth of labour and social 
rate of time-preference. Thus, we are guaranteed a positive 
marginal utility of consumption over time for a sufficiently 
high rate of per capita consumption. Dynamic equilibrium is 
maintained by taking social rate of time-preference equal to 
the rate of growth of labour. 
We are now in a position to prove the claim made at the 
outset of this section. 
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Theorem 6: The marginal utility of per capita consumption 
i <P \x] 
over time j has the same sign as the 
( <p [xj b 
rate of change of per capita consumption (x). 
Proof: Differentiating Equation (53) with respect to 
time yields 
0 [*(*)]' = A ei01-?)' x(t). . . . (58) 
Now, A is positive and the exponential function 
is always positive for a finite argument. Hence, 
the only dependence on sign is due to the time 
rate of change of per capita consumption, 
x{t). Hence the result. 
Q.E.D. 
Notice that if the social rate of time-preference equals 
the growth rate of labour, the marginal rate of per capita 
consumption is directly proportional to the time rate of 
change of per capita consumption with no other time 
dependence entering in. Clearly, then, this would be a 
natural choice for the social rate of time-preference, a. 
We, therefore, reach the (obvious) result that, in order 
to keep the third term in Equation (11), positive government 
policy in an Islamic economy must aim at a positive x(t) 
to ensure that in the process of economic growth per capita 
consumption also rises.3 Furthermore, as pointed out in 
Chapter 3, the functional u[x] in Equation (3) will have to 
3 Also, note that in the process of proving this important proposition, it was also establish-
ed that a must be positive in dynamic equilibrium to provide enough investible saving for rising 
labour force. 
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be constructed in a model of an Islamic economy in such a 
manner that the consumption requirements of the least-
privileged groups in the society receive the highest priority. 
The need for an active government policy thus becomes even 
more compelling. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 7 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The main contribution of this Essay has been to bring 
into the unified framework of optimization theory certain 
diverse problems of ethics and economics — that is, problems 
relating to intergenerational equity, efficiency and growth. 
We maximize, by an appropriate choice of a set of policy 
instruments, a utility functional which incorporates the 
essential Islamic ethical norms, subject to the constraint of 
optimal economic growth. It turns out that the solution of 
this dynamic optimization problem also yields the necessary 
condition to 'separate' the institution of interest from the 
three (additive) essential functions it performs, viz. a, j8 and 
x . We use Pontryagin's Maximum Principle to solve 
em in hand. With a few additional theorems we also 
establish that each of these three functions must be perform-
ed to keep (any) capital-scarce economy in dynamic equilib-
rium. We conclude that, in general, what holds for any other 
dynamic economy also holds for an Islamic economy. 
That done, we can easily show what policies cannot 
help to 'solve' the problem: we cannot abolish a positive rate 
of interest by simply ordering that the price of capital be 
jp" M 
(. 0 ' [x 
the pro i 
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zero in an Islamic economy, nor can we hope to achieve 
the Islamic ideal by legislating that all financial instruments 
ensuring a fixed rate of return on investment be replaced 
by those which promise only variable rates of return.1 
What we have done is to prove that the last-mentioned 
financial 'reform', proposed by many Muslim economists, 
can be made economically (and logically) plausible only by 
guaranteeing that the rate of reward on investment (saving) 
after the reform will always be higher than the corresponding 
rate before the reform. However, if such a guarantee is 
Islamically acceptable, then financial instruments bearing 
fixed rates of return must also be acceptable. By establishing 
this last result we hope to have cleared up a major source 
of confusion both about the nature of the problem and about 
the ways in which it cannot be solved. Such an analysis also 
gives us an inkling of fruitful ways of solving the problem. 
A legitimate question arises at this point: if, as we show, 
the basic laws of motion are the same for all economic 
systems, then are we not by the same token arguing against 
the need for an Islamic economic system? The answer 
is that these two statements are not necessarily connected 
with each other. The need for establishing an Islamic 
economic system may be established independently on 
'Using a different analytical framework and a different set of arguments, Khan [2 | shows 
that an economy based on variable rates of return alone will have to bear net ' Information costs" 
which are minimized at present by financial instruments bearing a fixed rate of return. However, 
it should be noted that in so far as all information gets quickly capitalized in the price of asset, it 
has a zero value. The recognition of this point forms the basis of "random walk" theories of 
financial market behaviour. But, in a world characterized by "random walk", the distribution of 
wealth will be highly skewed; and once inequalities in the distribution of wealth are created, 
there is no mechanism in such a world to correct them. This is the point we have emphasized in 
the text. 
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ethico-religious grounds, without implying that the basic 
laws of motion of a dynamic economy either are wrong or 
need a fundamental revision. Assuming, then, that the basic 
laws of economic dynamics are the same across different 
economic systems, the actual allocation of investment 
resources over time will be different depending on the 
'weight' that is assigned to each of these functions in any 
specific economic system. And such systemic differences 
require an explicit specification of a set of institutions and a 
set of social policies which, in turn, may reflect distinctive 
ethical principles.2 
This is a fundamental point because the solutions most 
relevant in the context of one type of economic framework 
may be entirely irrelevant in the context of another type of 
economic framework. Like mathematical structures, which 
are completely defined by their fundamental assumptions 
and the logical consequences of these assumptions, economic 
systems are also 'self-sufficient' entities. The truth of one 
economic system may become false in another economic 
system. In particular, the choice of policy instruments is 
constrained by those which are 'permissible' in a given 
economic framework. For instance, under capitalism the 
three essential functions which Equation (11) has pinpointed 
are performed by a positive rate of interest, while in a social-
istic economy a complete socialization of all means of 
production makes interest a mere arithmetical discount-
ing-device to determine the rank-ordering of different in-
vestment portfolios. An Islamic society prohibits interest 
mainly on ethical grounds. It is, therefore, a basic question, 
2This point has been emphasized by Tinbergen [9 ] . 
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and a non-trivial one at that, as to how to translate this 
ethical principle into a set of policy instruments that are 
economically viable and Islamically acceptable. 
In this connection, we take the view that while the 
prohibition of interest in Islam is total and unalterable, the 
exact manner of enforcing this commandment in modern 
societies is an open question on which opinions can 
legitimately differ.3 This is what the present Essay has 
attempted to do: to pose the problem in an analytically 
meaningful way; to reject arguments that are economically, 
logically and ethically unacceptable; and to set up guide-
posts along which future work on the subject must be 
undertaken. 
This general point has a direct bearing on the widely 
advocated policy alternative of making a total shift to a 
profit-based economy. In the opinion of the present authors, 
this is a question on which there is all the room for debate 
and discussion. We are of the opinion that no orthodoxy 
should be created to support the naive notion that profits 
are somehow sacrosanct. Nothing could be more dangerous 
for systematic thinking on Islam's economic philosophy. For 
profits can be, as they are, as exploitative and morally 
reprehensible as interest.4 This is not to justify the 
3 At a philosophical level, this is what has been termed by Frithjof Schuon [7) as the 
'human margin', which permits human beings to organize their social and economic relations in 
keeping with the exigencies of time and place. In particular, there is more than one sequential 
strategy to translate a Divine Message which is both perfect and timeless into imperfect, time-
bound human institutions. 
4 It is interesting to recall that Karl Marx made profits, not interest, the primary target of 
his criticism. According to him, profits symbolized the exploitation of labour by capitalists. See 
[6, Ch. 3 ] . 
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institution of interest, but to show that a profit-based regime, 
in which only variable rates of return on investment are 
allowed, is not necessarily the only alternative to it. 
The need or justification of Islamic economic reforms 
cannot be based just on the choice between the fixity or 
variability of the rates of return on investment. It will, 
instead, depend upon its success in inducing a restructuring 
of the economy in conformity with the Islamic principle of 
al 'Adl; and that would require making changes in the struc-
ture of economic power, involving a redistribution of income 
and wealth in the society, if the Islamic economic system is 
seen as a special type of "optimum regime", with a set of 
parameters, objectives and policy instruments, then a move 
from the existing economic system must of necessity involve 
a transfer of resources from the rich to the poor.5 We have 
shown that an economy-wide shift from interest to profit 
will not bring about such structural changes; for the 
unintended changes in the distribution of income and wealth 
that such a shift is most likely to induce are totally unaccept-
able to the Islamic principle of al 'Adl. 
This observation has a direct bearing on the question of 
the role of government in an Islamic economy for the simple 
reason that individual initiative cannot be relied upon to 
carry out a programme of structural change. Although we 
have not discussed this question in any detail, the basic 
5Tinbergen [10] observes that "as a rule the optimum regime requires income transfers" 
(p. 302). In the same vein is the observation made in the Willy Brandt Commission Report: 
"Where assets are distributed more fairly in the first place, sustained economic growth can 
provide jobs and better conditions for the poor" [1]
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point to remember in this context is that the role of govern-
ment in an Islamic society will be decided by the functions 
that it is called upon to perform. Being representative of 
the social conscience, it must do what the society requires 
it to do. In reaching out for a full-fledged Islamic economic 
system, a truly representative government will have to play a 
central role.6 The crux of the problem is how to set up 
alternative ways of solving the problem, including many 
combinations of individual autonomy and public control. It 
is important that not many doctrinaire exclusions are made 
in thinking about an Islamic economic system. For instance, 
pointing out that public control of economic processes 
is Islamically illegitimate is both unhelpful and meaningless. 
If public control is un-Islamic just because it reminds us of 
socialism, would it be logical to justify, in the name of Islam, 
measures that logically lead to private capitalism? All that 
can be said, at the level of generality at which we are operat-
ing, is that an ideal Islamic society will abhor an extremist 
solution: it will reject laissez faire private capitalism as well as 
a complete control by the State of all the means of 
production. Since the Divine Law of al 'Adl applies both to 
the State and to individuals, there is no room in an Islamic 
society for either State capitalism, or for communism or for 
private capitalism.7 
It may be argued that abolition of interest is a Divine 
commandment and so is also the respect for every individual 
in view of his theomorphic nature. It may then appear that 
6Several Muslim economists, especially Baqir-ul-Sadr, have advocated a predominant role 
of the State in an Islamic society. See M. Nejatullah Siddiqui's wide-ranging essay [8, esp. pp. 
1 8 - 2 3 ] . 
7 See Naqvi et al. [ 5 ] . 
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pointing out an inconsistency between abolition of interest 
and freedom of the individual amounts to saying that there is 
an inconsistency in the Divine Message. This is false 
reasoning. For Islam, by rejecting unbridled individualism, 
subjects individual action to social responsibility which rests 
on moral constraints. However, even at the level where such 
an inconsistency may appear in practice, it can be explained 
in terms of the greater social benefits that a curtailment of 
individual freedom will entail.8 True, the Divine Will 
demands perfection which leaves no room for any 
inconsistencies; yet, at the plane of human existence, this 
perfection remains an ideal to be approximated, in stages, 
with varying degrees of success and with the imperfections 
that characterize all human solutions. 
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